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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
THE 1982-1983 TERM 
Part I 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
The 1982-1983 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court 
ended on July 6, 1983. This is the first of two arti· 
cles reviewing the major decisions involving 
criminal procedure decided this Term. The issue 
that most observers thought would be the most 
significant one addressed this Term was not decid· 
ed. In Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), the 
Court, after requesting argument on the issue, 
declined to decide whether the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule embraced a "good faith" excep-
tion. Writing for a majority, Justice Rehnquist com-
mented: "We decide today, with apologies to all, 
that the issue we framed for the parties was not 
presented to the Illinois courts and, accordingly, 
do not address it." /d. at 2321. The Court, however, 
subsequently granted certiorari in three cases that 
raise the good faith exception: Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, 32 Grim. L. Rptr. 2157 (Mass. 1982); Col-
orado v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1983); U.S. v. 
Leon (9th Cir. 1983); cert. granted, 33 Grim. L. Rptr. 
4093-94 (1983). Thus, it seems all but certain that 
the issue will be resolved next Term. 
The Court also declined to decide another case 
on procedural grounds. In City of Los Angles v. 
Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983), the respondent filed 
suit in federal court alleging that the police had il-
legally used a "chokehold" which rendered him un-
conscious and caused damage to his larynx while 
he was stopped for a traffic violation. The district 
court entered a preliminary injunction against the 
use of chokeholds. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, 
refused to consider the merits of the claim on the 
grounds that the respondent had failed to satisfy 
the case or controversy requirements of Article Ill 
of the Constitution. According to the majority, the 
respondent had not shown a "real and immediate 
threat" that he would again be subjected to a 
chokehold. 
ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy - Beepers 
In U.S. v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983), the Court 
addressed the issue of whether the use of a 
"beeper" came within the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment and was therefore subject to 
the warrant and probable cause requirements. In 
Knotts the defendants were charged with the un-
lawful manufacture of controlled substances. After 
the police had focused their investigation on the 
defendant, a beeper (a small radio transmitter) was 
attached to a five-gallon drum of chloroform, a 
substance used in the manufacture of illicit drugs. 
The beeper enabled the police to track a car, in 
which the drum was subsequently loaded, to a 
cabin. Based on this and other information, the 
police obtained a warrant and discovered a 
clandestine drug laboratory in the cabin. The 
defendant moved to suppress this evidence on 
Fourth Amendment grounds. The Eighth Circuit 
ruled in favor of the defendant. 
On review, however, the Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the use of a beeper is neither 
a search nor a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. In reaching this result, the 
Court cited Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967), as the 
controlling precedent. Under Katz and its progeny, 
the Fourth Amendment protects only activities in 
which a person has a justifiable expectation of 
privacy. According to the Court, a "person travel-
ling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his move-
ments from one place to another." 103 S. Ct. at 
1085. "Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohib-
ited the police from augmenting the sensory facili-
ties bestowed upon them at birth with such en-
hancement as science and technology afforded 
them in this case." /d. at 1086. 
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This last statement was questioned by Justice 
Stevens, who, in a concurring opinion, pointed out 
that in Katz the Court reached a different result 
when it held that the augmentation of natural 
senses through electronic eavesdropping devices 
was covered by the Fourth Amendment. /d. at 1089. 
The Court left one issue concerning the use of 
beepers unresolved. Knotts did not challenge the 
legality of the police's conduct in installing the 
beeper; it had been installed with the consent of 
the manufacturer prior to the time the drum was 
purchased by the defendant. In a footnote, the 
Court observed: "Respondent does not challenge 
the warrantless installation of the beeper in the 
container .... We note that while several Courts of 
Appeals have approved warrantless installa-
tions, ... we have not before and do not now pass 
on the issue." /d. at 1084n. * *. Thus, if the police 
had entered the defendant's house or garage to in-
stall the beeper, the Court would have confronted 
a different issue. 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy - Containers 
Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983), in-
volved the warrantless search of a container which 
the defendant had received from Calcutta. When 
the container arrived at O'Hare International Air-
port, a customs inspector found marijuana hidden 
in a table packed in the container. The inspector 
notified a DEA agent who resealed the container 
and, along with another officer, delivered the con-
tainer to the defendant's apartment. After the con-
tainer was left with the defendant, one officer kept 
the apartment under surveillance while the other 
sought a warrant. Before a warrant could be ob-
tained, however, the defendant left his apartment 
with the container. He was arrested and taken to a 
stationhouse where the container was reopened 
without a warrant. Relying on container search 
cases, see Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 
(1979); U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the lower 
courts had held the search invalid. The Supreme 
Court reversed. 
The majority's analysis, however, was not based 
on a warrant exception. Instead, the Court held 
that reopening the container was not a search. Ac-
cording to the Court, "No protected privacy in-
terest remains in contraband in a container once 
government officers lawfully have opened that con-
tainer and identified its contents as illegal." /d. at 
3323. The Court recognized that some limitation on 
its holding was necessary; at some subsequent 
point, a person's expectations of privacy in a 
returned container would be justified. Accordingly, 
the Court wrote that "absent a substantial likeli-
hood that the contents have been changed, there 
is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the con-
tents of a container previously opened under law-
ful authority." /d. at 3325. Applying this standard, 
the Court found that the "unusual size of the con-
tainer, its specialized purpose, and the relatively 
short break in surveillance, combined to make it 
substantially unlikely that the respondent removed 
the table or placed new items inside the container 
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while it was in this apartment." /d. Thus, the police 
had not intruded upon any legitimate expectation 
of privacy. 
Justice Brennan, dissenting along with Justice 
Marshall, criticized the Court for its novel holding: 
"We have, to my knowledge, never held that the 
physical opening and examination of a container 
in the possession of an individual was anything 
other than a 'search.' It might be a permissible 
search or an impermissible search, require a war-
rant or not require a warrant, but it is [in] any event 
a 'search.' " /d. 
Probable Cause 
Although the Court bypassed the opportunity to 
rule on the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule, it did decide an important Fourth 
Amendment issue in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 
2317 (1983). In Gates the police received an 
anonymous letter stating that Lance and Sue 
Gates derived their income from illicit drug traffic, 
kept drugs in their home, and were about to depart 
to Florida for the purpose of obtaining drugs. The 
police corroborated a number of the facts set forth 
in the letter, including the fact that Lance Gates 
left by plane for Florida, met a woman there, and 
departed West Palm Beach in a car registered to 
him. Based on this information, the police obtain-
ed a warrant and searched the Gates' car and 
home when they arrived back in illinois. Marijuana 
was discovered. 
The Court agreed that the letter alone did not 
provide probable cause, and thus considered 
whether the corroboration produced by the police 
investigation amounted to probable cause. In 
holding the search invalid, the Illinois Supreme 
Court applied the two-pronged test derived from 
Spinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410 (1964). Under this test, 
an informant's tip must satisfy two independent 
requirements. First, the tip must establish the in-
formant's basis of knowledge; and second, the in-
formation given the magistrate must establish that 
the informant is credible or his information is 
reliable. The state court found both prongs defi-
cient; there was no information upon which the 
magistrate could determine that the informant was 
credible, and the corroboration of innocent details 
did not establish that the tip was reliable. More-
over, there was no information showing the basis 
of the informant's knowledge. 
In upholding the search, the Court, in an opinion 
written by Justice Rehnquist, jettisoned the 
Spinelli two-pronged test and substituted a "totali-
ty of the circumstances" test, under which the 
credibility of the informant, the reliability of his 
information, and the basis of his knowledge are 
merely factors in determining probable cause. 
Under this analysis, "a deficiency in one [prong] 
may be compensated for, in determining the 
overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as 
to the other, or by some other indicia of 
reliability." ld. at 2329. 
The Court offered several reasons for rejecting 
Spinelli. According to the Court, that test "has en-
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couraged an excessively technical dissection of in-
formant's tips." /d. at 2330. Moveover, the 
"rigorous inquiry into the Spinelli prongs and the 
complex superstructure of evidentiary and analyti-
cal rules that some have seen implicit in our 
Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the 
fact that many warrants are- quite properly ... 
- issued on the basis of nontechnical, common-
sense judgments of laymen applying a standard 
less demanding than those used in more legal pro-
ceedings." /d. at 2330-31. Such technical applica-
tions might also encourage the police to "resort to 
warrantless searches, with the hope of relying on 
consent or some other exception to the warrant 
clause that might develop at the time of the 
search." /d. at 2331. 
The Court summarized the totality of the cir-
cumstances test in the following passage: 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all 
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before 
him, including the "veracity" and "basis of know-
ledge" of persons supplying the hearsay information, 
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence 
of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the 
duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the 
magistrate had a "substantial basis for ... conclud-
[ing]" that probable cause existed. /d. at 2332. 
Although the Court went on to state that mere 
conclusory assertions in a affidavit would not 
satisfy this test, the opinion provides very little 
guidance. For the Court, the corroboration of the 
innocent details set forth in the letter as well as 
the "range of details" provided was sufficient in 
Gates. /d. at 2335. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice White joined the 
Court's judgment. Significantly, however, he 
based his opinion on the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule. According to Justice White, 
the Spinelli two-pronged test should not be re-
jected. Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by 
Justice Marshall, also disagreed with the Court's 
abandonment of the Spinelli test because the new 
test "provides no assurance that magistrates, 
rather than the police, or informants, will make 
determinations of probable cause; imposes no 
structure on magistrates' probable cause inquiries, 
and invites the possibility that intrusions may be 
justified on less than reliable information from an 
honest or credible person .... " /d. at 2359. Justice 
Stevens also dissented, finding that the tip did not 
satisfy the probable cause requirements. 
Plain View 
The Court's most extensive discussion of the 
plain view doctrine is found in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, a 
plurality of the Court specified three requirements 
for a plain view seizure. First, the initial intrusion 
which brings the evidence into plain view must be 
~··. lawful. Second, the discovery of the evidence must 
'~ be "inadvertent"; that is, the police must not know 
in advance that the evidence will be discovered. 
This requirement protects against pretext search-
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es. Third, the incriminating nature of the evidence 
must be "immediately apparent." 
In Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983), the 
Court elaborated on these requirements. Brown's 
car was stopped by the police at a routine driver's 
license checkpoint. When the officer shined his 
flashlight into the car, he observed a green party 
balloon in the defendant's hand. Alerted, he 
changed position and noticed several small plastic 
vials and quantities of white powder in an open 
glove compartment. The defendant was then 
ordered out of the car and the balloon seized. 
The Court upheld the seizure. Applying the plain 
view doctrine, the Court found the initial stop 
valid, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), and 
that the use of the flashlight to see into the car 
and glove compartment was not a search. U.S. v. 
Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927). The Court also found that 
the seizure was "inadvertent"; the roadblock was 
not a pretext. 103 S. Ct. at 1543. More importantly, 
the Court explained that the requirement that the 
incriminating nature of the evidence be immediate-
ly apparent meant that the officer must have had 
probable cause that the evidence was associated 
with criminal activity. According to the Court, the 
officer, based on his experience, had probable 
cause to seize the balloon. /d. at 1543. 
Justice Stevens, concurring, objected to one 
aspect of the Court's opinion, finding that it gave 
"inadequate consideration to our cases holding 
that a closed container may not be opened with a 
warrant, even when the container is in plain view 
and the officer has probable cause to believe con-
traband is concealed within." /d. at 1545. 
Stationhouse Inventory Searches 
In Illinois v. LaFayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983), the 
Court addressed the constitutionality of station-
house inventory searches. The police transported 
the defendant to the stationhouse after placing 
him under arrest for disturbing the peace. At the 
stationhouse he was required to empty his pockets 
and turn over a purse-type shoulder bag. Searching 
the bag, the police found amphetamine pills. 
Although the prosecution argued that the search 
could be justified as a delayed search incident to 
arrest, the Supreme Court decided the issue on the 
basis of an inventory search: "At the stationhouse, 
it is entirely proper for police to remove and list or 
inventory property found on the person or in the 
possession of an arrested person who is to be jail-
ed." /d. at 2609. 
As an administrative search, the inventory pro-
cedure requires neither a warrant nor probable 
cause. According to the Court, such a standard-
ized procedure deters false claims, inhibits theft or 
careless handling of articles, removes dangerous 
instrumentalities, and assists in identifying the ar-
restee. The fact that the police could have used 
less intrusive means, such as placing the purse in 
a secure locker, was not considered significant. 
Concurring, Justices Marshall and Brennan 
pointed out that the search could not have been 
justified as a search incident to arrest because it 
had not been undertaken for the purpose of protec-
ting the officer or preventing the destruction of 
evidence. /d. at 2611. 
Stop & Frisk - Request for Identification 
Kolander v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983), in-
volved a challenge to a California penal statute 
that required persons who loiter or wander on the 
street to provide credible and reliable identifica-
tion and to account for their presence under cir-
cumstances that would justify a stop under Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Failure to provide such 
identification is disorderly conduct, a misde-
meanor. Edward Lawson was detained or arrested 
approximately 15 times pursuant to this statute. 
He was prosecuted twice and convicted once. 
Lawson filed a civil suit seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the statute was unconstitutional; he 
also sought injunctive relief and damages. 
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice 
O'Connor, held the statute unconstitutional under 
the void-for-vagueness doctrine. As the Court 
pointed out, the statute was not simply a stop-and-
identify law. Under the California cases the statute 
had been interpreted to require that persons de-
tained provide "credible and reliable" identifica-
tion that carries a "reasonable assurance" of its 
authenticity and provides the "means for later get-
ting in touch with the person who has identified 
himself." /d. at 1859. 
In examining the statute, the Court set forth the 
rationale for the vagueness doctrine. "[T]he void-
for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal 
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that 
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." /d. at 1858. It was the second 
aspect that doomed the California statute. Neither 
the statute nor the state court decisions provided 
a "standard for determining what a suspect has to 
do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide a 
'credible and reliable' identification." /d. at 1859. 
Consequently, the decision whether credible and 
reliable identification has been produced is en-
trusted to the unguided discretion of the 
policeman on the beat. 
Having disposed of the case on this ground, the 
Court declined to discuss the other issues raised. 
/d. at 1860 n.10. Justice Brennan, in a concurring 
opinion, however, concluded that the statute also 
violated the Fourth Amendment: 
In sum, under the Fourth Amendment, police officers 
with reasonable suspicion that an individual has com-
mitted or is about to commit a crime may detain that 
individual, using some force if necessary, for the pur-
pose of asking investigative questions. They may ask 
their questions in a way calculated to obtain an an-
swer. But they may not compel an answer, and they 
must allow the person to leave after a reasonably 
brief period of time unless the information they have 
acquired during the encounter has given them prob-
able cause to justify an arrest. 
California cannot abridge this constitutional rule by 
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making it a crime to refuse to answer police ques-
tions during a Terry encounter .... /d. at 1863. 
Stop & Frisk - Drug Courier Profile 
The defendant in Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 
1319 (1983), was stopped at Miami International 
Airport by two plain-clothes detectives because he 
fit the "drug courier profile." They asked him if he 
had a "moment" to speak with them and he 
replied, "Yes." Upon request, he gave them his 
airline ticket and driver's license, which contained 
different names. At this point, the police stated 
that he was suspected of transporting narcotics 
and requested that he accompany them to a small 
room. They subsequently brought in his luggage 
and asked to search it. He gave them the keys. 
Drugs were discovered in the luggage. 
Before the Supreme Court, the state proffered 
three arguments in support of the officer's con-
duct. First, they argued that the entire encounter 
was consensual. A plurality of the Court, in an 
opinion by Justice White, found this argument 
"untenable": 
Asking for and examining Royer's ticket and his 
driver's license were no doubt permissible in them-
selves, but when the officers identified themselves as 
narcotics agents, told Royer that he was suspected of 
transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany 
them to the police room, while retaining his ticket and 
driver's license without indicating in any way that he 
was free to depart, Royer was effectively seized for 
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment: /d. at 1326. 
Second, the state argued that even if the defen-
dant had been seized, the seizure was based on a 
reasonable articulable suspicion under Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). While conceding that the 
early stages of the encounter could be justified 
under this theory, the plurality found that by the 
time Royer turned over the key to the suitcase, he 
was as "a practical matter" under arrest. 103 S. Ct. 
at 1327. In support of this conclusion, the plurality 
pointed out that the officers had Royer's ticket and 
identification, had seized his luggage, had never 
informed him that he was free to leave, and had 
taken him to a small room where he was alone 
with the two officers. 
The plurality also concluded that the officer's 
conduct was more intrusive than necessary to ef-
fectuate an investigative detention under Terry. 
There were no safety or security reasons that re-
quired the transfer of Royer from the concourse to 
the room, and alternative investigative measures, 
such as the use of dogs to detect the presence of 
controlled substances in the luggage, were not 
used. This aspect of the Terry rule was summariz-
ed as follows: "[A]n investigative detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the 
investigative methods.employed should be the 
least intrusive means reasonably available to verify 
or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period 
of time." /d. at 1325. 
Third, the state argued that the seizure was 
based upon probable cause, an argument rejected 
by the plurality. Justices Powell and Brennan con-
curred in the plurality opinion; four Justices 
dissented. 
Stop & Frisk - Seizure of Property 
,0 Raymond Place aroused the suspicion of nar-
cotics agents before he boarded a plane at Miami 
International Airport. After discovering discrepan-
cies in the address and telephone number that he 
had provided, the agents notified agents in New 
York, who met Place when he deplaned, After he 
refused to consent to a search of his bags, the 
agents seized them. Place, however, was permitted 
to depart. The bags were then taken to a different 
airport where they were subjected to a "sniff test" 
by a trained narcotics dog. The dog reacted 
positively. The entire episode, from the seizure to 
the sniff test, took approximately 90 minutes. 
Because it was late on a Friday afternoon, the 
agents did not apply for a warrant until the follow-
ing Monday morning, when one was issued by a 
magistrate. A search of the bags revealed cocaine. 
The Supreme Court addressed the legality of the 
agent's conduct in U.S. v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 
(1983). 
In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court 
held that the initial seizure was valid under the 
stop and frisk doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). The Court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that Terry applied only in circumstances 
where the police's safety was involved. "In sum, 
we conclude that when an officer's observations 
W lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is 
carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the prin-
ciples of Terry and its progeny would permit the of-
ficer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate 
the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, pro-
vided the investigative detention is properly limited 
in scope." /d. at 2644. 
The Court next considered whether conducting a 
"sniff-test" constituted a search within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that 
it did not. The sniff test did not involve opening 
the luggage, nor did it involve "an officer's rum-
maging through the contents of luggage." /d. at 
2644. Moreover, although the test does tell the 
police something about the contents of the lug-
gage, the information is limited to disclosing the 
presence or absence of drugs. 
Finally, the Court considered the duration of the 
detention. Here, the Court rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that the seizure of property 
should be distinguished from the seizure of the 
person because the former is generally less in-
trusive. According to the Court, "such a seizure 
can effectively restrain the person since he is sub-
jected to the possible disruption of his travel plans 
in order to remain with his luggage or to arrange 
_ for its return." /d. at 2645. Applying the Terry 
~ cases, the Court ruled the detention unconstitu-
,_ tional. The agents had ample time, according to 
the Court, to arrange for the dog's presence since 
they knew in advance the time of arrival. "Thus, 
although we decline to adopt any outside time 
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limitation for a permissible Terry stop, we have 
never approved a seizure of the person for the pro-
longed 90-minute period involved here and cannot 
do so on the facts presented by this case." /d. at 
2646. The Court also noted that the violation was 
exacerbated "by failure of the agents to accurately 
inform respondent of the place to which they were 
transporting his luggage, of the length of time he 
might be dispossessed, and of what arrangements 
would be made for return of the luggage if the in-
vestigation dispelled the suspicion." /d. 
Justice Marshall, along with Justice Brennan, 
concurred in the judgment but disagreed with 
parts of the majority opinion. The difference be-
tween Justice Marshall and the majority is signifi-
cant. According to Justice Marshall, "While Terry 
may authorize seizures of personal effects incident 
to a lawful seizure of the person, nothing in the 
Terry line of cases authorizes the police to seize 
personal property, such as luggage, independent 
of the seizure of the person." /d. at 2649. In his 
view, Terry left unchanged the rule that seizures of 
property must be based on probable cause. /d. at 
2650. Justice Blackmun also concurred, in an opin-
ion joined by Justice Marshall. In his view, the 
sniff-test issue should not have been addressed by 
the Court because it had not been raised by the 
defendant. 
Stop & Frisk - Protective Weapons Search 
In Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), po-
lice officers approached the defendant's stopped 
car after they had observed it speeding and travel-
ling erratically. After the officers asked for the 
car's registration, the defendant began walking 
toward the driver's door which was open. When 
they observed a hunting knife, the police stopped 
and frisked the defendant. Looking for other 
weapons, they shone their flashlights into the car. 
Observing something protruding from under the 
armrest, they entered the car and examined the ob-
ject more closely. This examination led them to 
believe that marijuana was contained in the 
package. Long challenged the officer's entry into 
the car on the ground that Terry v. Ohio authorized 
only a limited pat-down search of a person and not 
the search of an area. 
On review, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by 
Justice O'Connor, rejected this reading of Terry. 
According to the Court, a "search of the passenger 
compartment of an automobile, limited to those 
areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, 
is permissible if the police officer possesses a 
reasonable belief based on 'specific and articu-
lable facts which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' 
the officers in believeing that the suspect is 
dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate 
control of weapons." /d. at 3480. 
Justice Brennan, along with Justice Marshall, 
dissented. In his view, "Nothing in Terry authorized 
police officers to search a suspect's car based on 
reasonable suspicion." !d. at 3484. 
INTERROGATIONS 
The defendant in Wyrick v. Fields, 103 S. Ct. 394 
(1982), was charged with rape. After arrest, he was 
released on his own recognizance and retained 
counsel. He requested a polygraph examination 
after conferring with counsel. Prior to the examina-
tion he signed a written consent form which ad-
vised him of his Miranda rights. At the conclusion 
of the examination, the examiner told him that 
there had been some deceit and asked if he could 
explain his answers. At this point, the defendant 
admitted having intercourse with the victim but 
claimed that the act was consensual. At trial he 
moved to suppress his statement. The motion was 
denied. The defendant subsequently commenced 
habeas proceedings and the Eighth Circuit granted 
relief, holding that the examiner had failed to pro-
vide warnings prior to the post-test interrogation. 
The Supreme Court summarily reversed in a per 
curiam opinion. The central issue in the case in-
volved the interpretation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 
U.S. 477 (1981), in which the Court had held that 
once a defendant had invoked his right to counsel 
under Miranda, he may not be interrogated unless 
he "initiates further communication, exchanges or 
conversations with the police." According to the 
Court, by requesting a polygraph examination, the 
defendant had "initiated interrogation" and thus 
no new warnings were required prior to the post-
test interrogation. 
Significantly, the Court declined to discuss 
whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel had been violated since that issue had not 
been considered by the lower court. Justice Mar-
shall's dissent indicates that he, at least, believed 
a substantial Sixth Amendment issue was present. 
The Court also relied on Edwards v. Arizona in 
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983). During 
the course of a vehicular homicide investigation, 
Bradshaw was asked to accompany the police to 
the stationhouse for questioning. After receiving 
Miranda warnings, he denied being the driver of 
the car. When the police rejected his story, he 
stated that he wanted an attorney and the ques-
tioning ceased. He was subsequently transported 
to the county jail, at which time he said, "Well, 
what is going to happen to me now?" The police 
officer responded by informing him that he did not 
have to talk and "since you have requested an at-
torney, you know, it has to be at your own free 
will." Bradshaw said he understood and a conver-
6 
sation ensued, during which the officer suggested 
a polygraph examination. The next day, after 
Miranda warnings were again read, a polygraph ex-
amination was conducted. When the examiner told 
Bradshaw that he did not believe Bradshaw was 
being truthful, Bradshaw changed his story and ad· 
mitted driving the vehicle while intoxicated. 
Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion. In 
Edwards the Court held that once the right to 
counsel has been invoked further questioning 
must cease "unless the accused himself initiates 
further communication, exchanges, or conversa-
tions with the police." 451 U.S. at 484-85. Accord-
ing to the plurality dpinion, the initiation require-
ment was intended as "a prophylactic rule, de-
signed to protect an accused in police custody 
from being badgered by police officers .... " 103 S. 
Ct. at 2834. This requirement, however, was only 
the first step in a two-step analysis. Even when thE 
defendant initiates the conversation, the prosecu-
tion must establish a voluntary waiver of the right 
to counsel. Having set forth this two-step analysis, 
the plurality found that both steps had been satis-
fied in the case. Although recognizing that many 
comments, such as asking for a drink of water or 
requesting to use the telephone, would not satisfy 
the "initiation" requirement, the plurality conclud-
ed that Bradshaw's statement, albeit ambiguous, 
evinced a willingness to discuss the investigation 
and that his subsequent conduct constituted a 
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. /d. at 2835 
Four dissenting Justices, in an opinion by 
Justice Marshall, agreed with the plurality's two-
step analysis. In other words, Edwards did 
establish a per se rule; in the absence of a 
defendant-initiated conversation, a subsequent 
statement is inadmissible. The dissenters, how-
ever, disagreed with the plurality's application of 
the two-step analysis to the facts. In their view, 
Bradshaw's question evinced only a desire to find 
out where he was being taken and not a desire to 
discuss the investigation. 
The critical vote in support of the judgment was 
cast by Justice Powell, who concurred. He be-
lieved that it was not clear that Edwards an-
nounced a per se rule. He also left no doubt that, 
in his opinion, such a rule was undesirable. Thus, 
although the Court was badly divided over the ap-
plication of Edwards, eight Justices did agree that 
the case established a two-step analysis and that 
the first step - the initiation requirement - was a 
per se requirement. 
